Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Hermeneutic circle: The hermeneutic circle is a process of interpretation in which the whole and its parts are mutually illuminating. It is a recursive process in which the interpreter moves back and forth between the whole text and its individual parts in order to arrive at a comprehensive understanding. See also Hermeneutics._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Martin Heidegger on Hermeneutic Circle - Dictionary of Arguments
Gadamer I 270 Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger/Gadamer: Heidegger writes: "The circle must not be pulled down to a vitiosum, even if it is a tolerated one. Hidden within it is a positive Gadamer I 271 possibility of the most original recognition, which of course is only genuinely grasped when the interpretation has understood that its first, permanent and final task is not to allow itself to be dictated by ideas and popular concepts, but to secure the scientific subject in its elaboration from the things themselves"(1). Gadamer: What Heidegger says here is not at first a demand on practice of understanding, but describes the form of execution of understanding interpretation itself. Heidegger's hermeneutical reflection has its peak not so much in proving that there is a circle here, but rather that this circle has an ontologically positive meaning. Understanding/Gadamer: Whoever wants to understand a text always starts out drafting, he or she throws a sense of the whole ahead, as soon as a first sense appears in the text. Such a sense is only revealed because one reads the text with certain expectations of a certain meaning. In the elaboration of such a preliminary draft, which is of course constantly revised from the point of view of what will emerge in the further penetration of the mind, there is an understanding of what is there. Heidegger/Gadamer: That each revision of the preliminary draft is in the possibility of throwing a new draft of meaning ahead, that rival drafts can Gadamer I 272 exist next to each other until the unity of meaning becomes more clearly defined; that interpretation begins with preliminary terms that are replaced by more appropriate terms: this constant re-drafting, which constitutes the sense movement of understanding and interpretation, is the process Heidegger describes. Objectivity: There is no other "objectivity" here than the probation that a preliminary opinion finds through its elaboration. Method: One has to think of this fundamental demand as the radicalization of a procedure that in truth we always practice when we understand. >Expectations/Gadamer. Gadamer I 298 Hermeneutic Circle/Heidegger/Gadamer: Schleiermacher (...) succeeds (...) in establishing harmony with the ideal of objectivity of the natural sciences, but only by [renouncing] to bring the concretion of historical consciousness in hermeneutic theory to the fore. >Hermeneutic Circle/Schleiermacher, >Hermeneutics/Schleiermacher. HeideggerVsSchleiermacher/Gadamer: Heidegger's description and existential justification of the hermeneutic circle, on the other hand, means a decisive turn. [Schleiermacher's theory culminated in the] doctrine of the divinatory act, through which one puts oneself completely in the author's place and from there dissolves everything foreign and alienating in the text. Heidegger: In contrast, Heidegger describes the circle in such a way that the understanding of the text remains permanently determined by the anticipatory movement of pre-conception. The circle of whole and part is not brought to dissolution in perfect understanding, but is actually accomplished. Ontology/method: The circle is thus not formal in nature. It is neither subjective nor objective, but describes understanding as the interplay of the movement of tradition and the movement of the interpreter. The anticipation of meaning that guides our understanding of a text is not an act of subjectivity, but is determined by the commonality that connects us with the tradition. But this common ground is in constant formation in our relationship with tradition. It is not simply a prerequisite, under which we have always been standing, but we create it ourselves, as long as we understand, participate in what has been handed down and thereby further determine it ourselves. The circle Gadamer I 299 of understanding is thus not at all a "methodological" circle, but describes an ontological structural moment of understanding. >Perfection/Gadamer. 1. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, 312ff_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Hei III Martin Heidegger Sein und Zeit Tübingen 1993 Gadamer I Hans-Georg Gadamer Wahrheit und Methode. Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik 7. durchgesehene Auflage Tübingen 1960/2010 Gadamer II H. G. Gadamer The Relevance of the Beautiful, London 1986 German Edition: Die Aktualität des Schönen: Kunst als Spiel, Symbol und Fest Stuttgart 1977 |
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> Counter arguments against Heidegger
> Counter arguments in relation to Hermeneutic Circle
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29